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The relationship between intelligence and policy has its ups and downs. Sometimes the relationship is a good one; communication flows and both sides benefit from the interaction. The optimal outcome entails the use of accurate intelligence analysis to improve decision-making. But sometimes difficulties arise and problems develop. For example, when knowledge is required for decision but is not available or is inaccurate the outcome is frequently described as an intelligence failure. A subset of this kind of intelligence failure occurs when knowledge is distorted in order to reinforce or oppose policymaker preferences or expectations. Another less successful outcome occurs when good, accurate knowledge is not used to improve policy, but is instead set aside or ignored by those who have the responsibility and obligation to make decisions. This set of articles explores the difficulties that can arise in the relationship between intelligence and policy. The reigning conceptual model of the role that intelligence organizations should play vis-à -vis policy is as neutral objective expert advisors providing information and assessment about the international environment or other actors without engaging in the creation or implementation of policy. But there are a wide variety of conceptions about the degree to which it should influence policy.
1 Some conceive of this role as a limited one; to accurately inform, assess and/or forecast, with the emphasis on the production of information and knowledge rather than its influence on policy. Others emphasize a subset of this limited role, focusing on the importance of providing the inconvenient fact or unwanted interpretation; to speak truth to power. But others view the role of intelligence differently; they conceive of it as a support to decision; to reduce uncertainty, ignorance, or incidence of surprise. And others are even more expansive in their perception of the role of intelligence; to influence policy outcomes for the better.
These expectations are usually implicit in the criteria used to evaluate intelligence performance. More limited conceptions of role are going to emphasize the importance of accuracy or objectivity as an evaluative criterion. More expansive conceptions are going to emphasize the importance of influence or impact on policymaker judgment or policy outcomes. A conceptual framework has been developed in an effort to capture this dynamic built around the relative proximity between intelligence and policy. Specifically, the proximity hypothesis suggests that greater distance between intelligence and policy produces a more accurate but less influential product whereas greater closeness leads to increased influence but decreased accuracy. Those who have a more limited conception of the role of intelligence and prefer distance over closeness have been labeled traditionalists while those who have a more expansive conception of the role of intelligence and prefer closeness over distance have been labeled activists.
2
Within this broader context, however, there is a problem with the definition and conceptualization of politicization. Most existing concepts of politicization in the intelligence context imply that the goal of intelligence analysis is to speak truth to power. When truth becomes distorted due to pressure from or desire to curry favor with power, then this is a corruption of the process that can easily lead to negative outcomes. Therefore a combination of objectivity and independence should protect the intelligence enterprise from the incentives to provide 'intelligence to please'. But some important scholars in the field have suggested that politicization is inevitable and in some sense may even be necessary.
3 This then raises an important question: how can a bad thing also be a good thing, or at least a necessary thing? What happens at the intersection of knowledge and action?
The set of articles contained in this special issue were all presented on Intelligence Studies Section panels at the 2011 International Studies Association conference, and take a closer look at politicization from the perspective of both traditionalists and activists. They describe different kinds of politicization, evaluate whether politicization is good or bad, explain why policymakers sometimes fail to be receptive to intelligence, and recommend ways to increase the receptivity of decision-makers to the positive influences of intelligence analysis.
Glenn Hastedt sets the stage by re-conceptualizing politicization based on the setting in which it takes place. Hastedt's approach to politicization is not normative; he does not view it as good or bad. Instead, it just is. Hastedt first creates a typology of different kinds of politicization. He distinguishes between soft and hard politicization and the setting in which each takes place. This provides him with a typology of different kinds of politicization which he then uses to categorize six historical incidents of politicization and explain how they came about. The value of this approach, according to Hastedt, is that it provides a framework to study and compare the different kinds of politicization that occur within an administration and across administrations.
My own contribution revisits existing conceptualizations of politicization in order to explain why it is a bad thing. It challenges the notion that there is much value in speaking truth to power since there is no evidence that policymakers confronted with the inconvenient fact or unwanted interpretation will change their minds or policy for the better. It also rejects the assumption implicit in prevailing notions of politicization that the intelligence analysts' combination of objectivity and independence somehow lead them inexorably and inevitably closer to the truth than the assessments made by decision-makers. Instead it suggests that much of what is considered to be negative politicization is in fact just the normal process of policymaking. In the end, with the exception of outright intent on the part of the intelligence analyst to distort the analysis, there is very little about politicization that is inherently bad.
Joshua Rovner examines and ultimately takes issue with the notion that politicization in some cases can be good or have beneficial effects. He does so by looking at both the conceptualization of politicization, including what he calls the nature of soft politicization, and maps it up against the historical record. After doing so, Rovner concludes that sugarcoating or soft-pedaling a message (failure to speak truth to power) to maximize receptivity or influence actually accomplishes neither. The implication of Rovner's analysis is that soft politicization does not lead to positive outcomes and those who think it can and act accordingly are gravely mistaken.
Erik Dahl evaluates and explains policymaker failure to be receptive to intelligence analysis. This is the opposite problem to politicization; rather than care too much about the message, in these cases policymakers may not care enough. This can result in a negative outcome as well; the failure of knowledge to influence decision-making for the better. Dahl evaluates the receptivity of decision-makers to intelligence using the cases of Pearl Harbor (failure to be receptive) and Midway (receptive) and concludes that 'the willingness of decision makers to listen to intelligence depends primarily on two factors: their belief in the seriousness of the issue or threat involved, and their trust in the utility of intelligence'. His findings help explain why sometimes even the best and most vivid intelligence may not be listened to, and may not prevent disaster or defeat.
Nathan Woodard, aware that sometimes negative outcomes result from policymaker failure to be receptive to intelligence analysis, suggests that intelligence analysts can and should make decision-makers listen to them. In making this argument, Woodard suggests that it is possible not only to benefit from politicization but that in fact intelligence organizations should be looking for the opportunities to do so. Woodard uses the concept of rhetoric to suggest that part of the purpose of intelligence analysis, as with all communication, is to convince. What is normally implicit in intelligence should, according to Woodard, be made explicit; if some aspects of politicization can be good, perhaps positive politicization should be embraced. Woodard argues that this kind of politicization can even be ethical if it is pursued within an evidence-based advocacy framework. Within this framework, politicization can be good and should be encouraged.
Each of these articles addresses topics that are both important and understudied: politicization, the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers, or both. There is as of yet no consensus as to what the relationship between intelligence and policy should be. In 1968, Sherman Kent looked at the influence that intelligence had on policy, and said: 'You will find that intelligence and what it contributes to the task, far from enjoying the overpowering importance with which we -quite understandably -like to endow it, is casually ticked off as one of a score of forces at work . . . Thus a certain amount of all this worrying we do about our influence upon policy is off the mark. For in many cases, no matter what we tell the policymaker, and no matter how right we are and how convincing, he will upon occasion disregard the thrust of our findings for reasons beyond our ken. If influence cannot be our goal, what should it be?' 4 Excluding the embedded judgment that the goal cannot be influence, this is a very good question because more than 40 years later we are still debating what its answer is.
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